Groundwater Management in Nebraska without a Legislative Solution: Is There an Alternative? by Klein, Mike
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 1 Article 5
1978
Groundwater Management in Nebraska without a
Legislative Solution: Is There an Alternative?
Mike Klein
University of Nebraska College of Law, kleinlaw@atcjet.net
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Mike Klein, Groundwater Management in Nebraska without a Legislative Solution: Is There an Alternative?, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 78 (1978)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol57/iss1/5
Commentary
Groundwater Management in
Nebraska Without a
Legislative Solution:
Is There an Alternative?'
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1975 session of the Nebraska Legislature enacted sections
46-656 to 46-674 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, rather optimisti-
cally entitled the "Nebraska Ground Water Management Act."'2 As
the legislative statement of intent indicates,3 the Act is designed
to manage and conserve groundwater 4 resources in an effort to in-
sure the present and future economic well-being of the state. The
legislative intent also purports to include a "demand," in the public
interest, to implement management practices.5 However laudable
this frank legislative recognition of the problem, the Act may fail
to accomplish its stated purpose by not providing sufficient means
for a politically feasible and constitutionally permissible solution.
If that is the case, as an analysis of the Act indicates, 6 and no more
definitive and comprehensive legislation is politically attainable,
two significant issues remain: First, what judicial means of resolv-
ing the problems inherent in a lack of comprehensive management
1. It has been stated by a well-known water law expert that "a rational
legal system will not only develop rules for resolving specific conflicts
which may arise; it will also devise techniques for avoiding conflict
by seeking to assure that there are adequate supplies available and
that water is properly used prior to times of crisis." J. SAX, WATER
LAW, PLANNING & PoLIcY 471 (1968).
2. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-656 to 674 (Cum. Supp. 1976) [hereinafter refer-
red to as the Act].
3. Id. § 46-656.
4. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1004 (1971) uses a
one word form of "groundwater" as opposed to the legislative title to
the Nebraska act. Accordingly, the dictionary usage will be followed
here.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-656 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
6. See notes 20-33 and accompanying text infra.
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are available, and second, how may those means be effected, until
or without further affirmative legislative action?
II. THE SCOPE OF THE GROUNDWATER PROBLEM
Hydrological and geological bases of defining problems of
groundwater management are the only means of understanding the
scope of those problems. The Nebraska Legislature, realistically
appraising this notion, provided in the Nebraska Ground Water
Management Act that the promulgation of any management solu-
tions should be done on the basis of "relevant hydrologic data, his-
tory of developments, and projection of effects of current and new
development."' 7 This realization is commendable. Without it, and
without the provision that any area subject to management regula-
tions must be "define [d] . . . geographically and stratigraphically," s
boundaries defined by surface features or political lines could pro-
duce chaotic results from attempts to apply corrective measures.9
The hydrological studies which are currently available 0 indicate
that the major Nebraska groundwater problem area is in the east-
central portion of Nebraska, where widespread groundwater min-
ing" exists.12 However, as discussed below, groundwater problems
in Nebraska do not follow any set pattern, and such varied problem
situations exist that no one solution is feasible. The mining situa-
tion in east-central Nebraska shows no immediate prospect for solu-
tion by any economically feasible means.' 3 This means that the
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
8. Id. § 46-658(3).
9. Complete documentation of the physical scope of any groundwater
management problem is obviously essential to its resolution. For ex-
ample, a lack of documentation could result in management controls
being made applicable to a surface water basin without regard to the
aquifer which gave rise to the problem. Uncontrolled diversion of the
aquifer from outside the basin subject to control could completely ne-
gate the effect of limiting diversions in the management area.
10. IRRIGATION AGE, October 1976, at 20.
11. Groundwater "mining" occurs when the total amount being pumped
from a groundwater basin during a given year exceeds the annual rate
of recharge in the basin, with the result that the water table in the
basin keeps dropping lower and lower. If groundwater continues to
be removed from the basin at a much greater rate than it is being
replenished, the entire source may be depleted. See J. SAx, supra note
1, at 468-71.
12. Large-scale mining has occured in the Big Blue River basin as well
as the areas around O'Neill and Imperial, Nebraska.
13. Possibly the most efficient means of solving groundwater mining
problems is to utilize an extensive surface storage and use system to
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only method of maintaining the aquifer in question, or any aquifer
in like circumstances, is to limit the withdrawal of water. This
method demands immediate as well as long range planning in regard
to the amount of withdrawals to be allowed, and as to the method
of control of withdrawals.1 4
III. REGULATION UNDER THE ACT
The Nebraska Ground Water Management Act provides a per-
vasive regulatory scheme for controlling the use and amount of
groundwater diversions.15 However, the Act itself does not impose
the scheme on the problem areas, which the Act terms "control
areas."1 6 Control areas can only be established after action is in-
stigated by a person or persons in the area sought to be designated.
After a hearing, the Director of Water Resources may, in his dis-
cretion, designate a control area.17 The problems inherent in this
provide natural recharge of the declining aquifer. See Harnsberger,
Oeltjen & Fischer, Groundwater: From Windmills to Comprehensive
Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179, 284 app. (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Harnsberger]. However, the cost of such a system
could conceivably be phenomenal. Theoretically, to recharge the
aquifer or aquifers necessary to resolve the groundwater problem in
east-central Nebraska would encompass a surface storage and use sys-
tem with the potential to irrigate literally hundreds of thousands of
acres. By comparison, the Bureau of Reclamation's proposed Niobrara
River project, which will irrigate a maximum of 77,000 acres, will cost
approximately $106,000,000.00. Even if surface construction and di-
version were economically feasible, complete geological and hydro-
logical studies would have to be undertaken to determine if the area
in question would be suitable for an improved groundwater table. In
any event, the recent experience of the now defunct Mid-State irriga-
tion project may make it politically and socially unrealistic to assume
that even a physically workable and economically feasible surface
storage and use system could succeed. (The project's continuation
was resoundingly defeated when put to the electorate.)
14. Harnsberger, supra note 13, at 264-80.
15. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-666 (Cum. Supp. 1976) is the basic regulatory
section of the Act. It places numerous options in the hands of the reg-
ulatory agencies to control groundwater diversions:(a) It [the regulatory agency] may determine the permis-
sible total withdrawal of ground water in the designated con-
trol area for each day, month, or year, and allocate such with-
drawal among the ground water users within the area;(b) It may adopt and enforce a system of rotation for use
of ground water in the control area;
(c) It may adopt well-spacing requirements . . . and
(d) It may adopt such other reasonable regulations as are
necessary to carry out the intent of this act.
16. Id. §§ 46-657(9) to 658.
17. Id. § 46-658.
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type of selection process are apparent. Without some initiation of
discussion within the area sought to be regulated, the Act has no
management effect at all, with the limited exception of mandatory
runoff controls.18 The Director of Water Resources and Natural
Resource Districts, charged with responsibility to administer the
Act, are thus left helpless to identify and initiate control over
problems.
This type of system, while commendable in that it provides for
local formulation of issues and consequent controls, is tantamount
to a legislative failure to deal with the problem. While the legis-
lative history of the Act indicates that local groups and individuals
are aware of declining groundwater levels and are predisposed to-
ward finding means to minimize such declines,19 there is no assur-
ance that these concerns will manifest themselves as use of the ef-
fective controls provided by the Act. To insure control in all prob-
lem areas, the legislature would have to delegate sufficient author-
ity to either the Director of Water Resources or the Natural
Resource Districts, or some other appropriate agency, to independ-
ently recognize and deal with groundwater problems. This is not
to say that the local input provided for by hearing procedures is
not valuable in tapping local views on groundwater problems.20
The localized nature of most groundwater deficiencies requires that
this continue, but a more definitive allocation of managerial power
to the agency responsible for the implementation of the Act would
be desirable.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS NOT
ADDRESSED BY THE ACT
Aside from administrative difficulties, several substantive issues
which greatly affect the management of groundwater resources in
Nebraska are left unrecognized or unresolved by the Act. Each
of the issues which the Act does not address has recurred in
Nebraska groundwater litigation, and has gone without conclusive
judicial resolution. Unfortunately, the legislative failure to at least
recognize these questions leaves them again in judicial hands.
The major issue which the Act fails to address is whether private
18. Id. § 46-664.
19. See Hearings on L.B. 577 Before the Comm. on Public Works, 84th Leg.,
1st Sess. 1-26 (March 13, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
20. The hearing procedure is outlined in NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(3)
(Cum. Supp. 1976).
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property rights in groundwater, if they exist, are cut off by the
legislation itself, without administrative action, or are capable of
extinction after a control area has been established. The resolution
of this issue involves a number of considerations.
First, the Act fails to recognize the hydrologically proven 2 1
interrelationship between groundwater and surface water. The
Nebraska Constitution provides that streamflows are dedicated to
the public for beneficial use,22 but the use of groundwater is not
so dedicated, either by constitution or statute. As a result the
status of proprietary interests in groundwater is subject to consid-
erable debate. While the legislative intent of the act can be read
as a commitment of groundwater to public use, a clearly stated pub-
lic use dedication would remove any confusion regarding the legis-
lative position. The Nebraska Supreme Court has not shown a pre-
disposition toward recognizing a private property interest in
groundwater, 23 but without a conclusive articulation of legislative
intent, the Act may encourage litigation.
This encouragement of litigation is especially serious in that
groundwater regulation pursuant to Natural Resource District con-
trol may be construed as "damaging" to private property values.
The Nebraska Constitution requires compensation for public use of
property which amounts to "damaging" as well as "taking" of the
property.24  As a result, if the legislative statement of intent in
the Act can be argued to be a constitutionally permissible dedication
of the use of groundwater to the public, a substantial question
arises regarding the need to compensate those landowners whose
land depreciates in value as a result thereof. This notion presup-
21. This assertion is not entirely correct in view of the fact that NEB. REV.
STAT. § 46-636 (Reissue 1974) provides: "The Legislature finds that
the pumping of water for irrigation purposes from pits located within
fifty feet of the bank of any natural stream may have a direct effect
on the surface flow of such stream." Just what the legislature in-
tended to accomplish by this rather inarticulate and poorly drafted bit
of legislation is unclear. The legislative history of the Nebraska
Ground Water Management Act indicates that one of the initial com-
plaints against the act was its failure to recognize that groundwater
and surface flows are directly connected in the hydrological cycle.
See Hearings, supra note 18, at 17-18. The foregoing statute hardly
goes far as a legislative recognition of that concept.
22. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
23. See Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140
N.W.2d 626 (1966).
24. NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
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poses regulation which will reduce the allowable diversion of
groundwater to such an extent that a measurable crop loss on the
property involved will result. If such loss can result from controls,
there is an issue beyond the constitutional permissibility of dedica-
tion of groundwater to the public, that is, compensation for measur-
able property damage as a result of the public use.25
Also bound up with the resolution of the proprietary rights issue
is the question of whether any preference or priority system ex-
ists within the Act's scheme of groundwater control. Surface
waters are subject to both a priority system of appropriation and
a preferential scheme of allocation, by statute2 6 and constitutional
provision. 2 7 By way of comparison, some explanation of the two
notions is warranted.
Priorities operate on the familiar first in time, first in right basis
that permeates so much of the law of property rights. The priority
doctrine was originally developed by judicial decision, but has since
been codified in most jurisdictions. 28  Most statutes operate by re-
quiring the user of the water resource to obtain permission in some
form, usually by permit, from the appropriate governmental
agency.29 The user must then put the appropriated water to a
defined beneficial use"0 to establish his right to divert. The right
then becomes protectable as of the date of the permit. Most stat-
utes require that the beneficial use begin within a designated time
25. It seems that a vested proprietary rights argument is a defensible posi-
tion, if only by implication in Nebraska. While the Nebraska Supreme
Court cases which dealt with groundwater issues, see, e.g., Metropolitan
Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966);
Luchsinger v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 140 Neb. 179, 299 N.W.
549 (1941); Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933),
do not specifically recognize such a right, it is arguable that propri-
etary interests are clearly presumed to exist. The Olson case provides
a good example. The court based its decision on a question of proxi-
mate cause. The court held that if no vested proprietary'right exists
in the unimpeded use of the groundwater resource, no cause of action
exists against one who interferes with such use, and no causation issue
arises. The prospect of allowing damages for an interference resulting
from a neighboring diversion seems to confirm that the proprietary
right exists in the landowner.
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-204 (Reissue 1974).
27. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
28. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-203 (Reissue 1974).
29. See, e.g., id. § 46-233.
30. For a discussion of proposals to reform the beneficial use concept as
it applies to surface water use, see Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen,
Rights to Nebraska Streamflows: An Historical Overview with Rec-
ommendations, 52 NEB. L. Rsv. 313, 370-73 (1973).
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after the issuance of the permit,31 and continue throughout the time
the user claims an appropriative right. Failure to maintain bene-
ficial use or to avoid waste are conditions which usually suspend
effectiveness of the priority, or extinguish it completely. 32
Preference systems are superimposed over priorities. This
means that a statutorily defined higher preference user may obtain
water from a lower preference, higher priority user in times of
shortage, if he compensates the lower preference user for any dam-
age incurred as a result of this taking. Appended to this system
is a typical caveat that a domestic user may exercise his right to
preferential treatment without compensating a lower preference
user who is damaged. 3
In regard to groundwater, while the Nebraska statutes delineate
a preference system for use of groundwater, 34 the result of this
articulation is not clear. If this preference scheme is viewed as
vesting groundwater rights in users preferred under the statutue,
this fosters the idea that some property right, which is capable of
enforcement by judicial or administrative means, does exist in
groundwater. Unfortunately, this again not only creates adminis-
trative difficulty in utilizing the management procedures provided
in the Act, but encourages litigation based on proprietary interests.
Presumably, actual shortages of groundwater supplies for domestic
use, as defined by the statute,3 5 will not eventuate if management
practices are instituted. But in tb absence of controls, widespread
domestic shortages occasioned by the depletion of a large aquifer
could result in incalculable loss to lower preference users who
would presumably be denied in times of shortage.3 6
Two other substantive issues arise in considering the deficiencies
of the Act. One is the problem of interbasin transfers, which in
Nebraska have been prohibited by judicial fiat since 1936. 37 While
31. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-238 (Reissue 1974).
32. But see, with reference to groundwater rights, Harnsberger, supra note
12, at 242-43.
33. See generally 78 Am. JUR. 2d Waters §§ 317-328 (1975).
34. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613 (Reissue 1974).
35. Id.
36. See Harnsberger, supra note 12, at 201: "[E]ach one dollar of crop
production made possible by irrigation created an additional 6.68 dol-
lars in business volume in other segments of the economy."
37. Osterman v. Central Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268
N.W. 334 (1936).
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the issue of transfers is beyond the scope of this article,38 it is
necessary to note that the continued prohibition of interbasin trans-
fers by the judiciary restricts the improvement of groundwater
aquifers through surface storage and use.39
The second issue has caused much discussion. The statute con-
tains no definition of beneficial use, and the preference scheme it
sets up places no value on either environmental, recreational or
aesthetic values.40 These quite obviously have a great deal of value
to some, and absolutely no value to others. As a result, the issue
is largely political, and should not be dealt with other than by legis-
lation. A good example of a means by which environmental,
recreational and aesthetic values can be safeguarded is section
37-109 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,41 which provides for the
acquisition and management of wildlife habitat lands by the state.
This statute avoids the difficult task of overcoming the accusation
that these interests are to the detriment of agricultural interests,
which should be protected in any water legislation.
V. JUDICIAL MEANS OF RESOLVING THE
ISSUES RAISED BY THE ACT
The resolution of the issues presented by the inadequacies of
the Act will ultimately fall upon the judiciary. The focus of
judicial inquiry, to be effective, must be on how to integrate the
resolution of those issues into a coherent form which will facilitate
long range planning for groundwater use by the persons and agen-
cies that are best equipped to dea4 with the problems. It is thus
important to focus on. each of the issues and to determine the
possible answers to both of the two questions initially raised: (1)
what judicial means of resolving the issues presented are available;
and (2) how may those means be effectuated?
A. Judicial Means for Controlling Groundwater Management
To approach the problems presented by the Act and prior
judicial attempts at management of groundwater resources, an
awareness of judicial means of groundwater management is neces-
38. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Oeltjen, Harnsberger &
Fischer, Interbasin Transfers: Nebraska Law and Legend, 51 NEB. L.
REv. 87 (1971).
39. Id.
40. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613 (Reissue 1974).
41. NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-109 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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sary. The basic judicial rules involved may be grouped into a
triumvirate.
The English, or common law rule, which arose from the ancient
concept that a property owner was master of not only the surface
of his ground, but the subterranean strata beneath it and the atmo-
sphere above it as well, was first articulated in Acton v. Blundell.42
The rule is one of absolute ownership: the overlying landowner
can utilize as much water as he can divert, even if his definition
of "utilize" includes wasting water to the detriment of his neighbor.
The American, or reasonable use, rule is based upon the familiar
tort doctrine of "reasonableness." While it limits the wasting of
groundwater to the detriment of other users, it otherwise is a rule
of absolute ownership.43 The reason for this result is that courts
have been disposed to employ, an economic balancing test to deter-
mine if a use is "reasonable;" in most instances, the higher volume
user, who has limited groundwater use by his neighbor, was the
most economically productive. While preference statutes have been
appended to the rule to insure that uses which are essential to the
maintenance of society will remain unimpeded, the effect has been
to allow the purchase of a license by a larger volume user of water.
Thus, rather than restricting the property right provided by the
common law rule of absolute ownership, the courts have been
merely raising the ante.
The final groundwater management tool which courts have
implemented is the correlative rights doctrine adopted initially by
the Supreme Court of California in Katz v. Walkinshaw." It
amounts to judicially legislated allocation of groundwater resources
in times of shortage. The problem with this type of judicial
management is that the administrative problems it creates are
immense. Courts must retain jurisdiction of each conflicting use
case with which they are confronted in order to enforce their
original decrees allocating groundwater resources. This taxes judi-
cial time. The ideal situation in these circumstances, if mandatory
legislative control is non-existant, is to have at the disposal of the
judiciary an administrative agency which possesses the requisite
expertise to provide informed advice regarding groundwater deci-
sions. Unfortunately, the usual situation is that the understaffed
42. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
43. See Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909).
44. 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 (1903).
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and non-expert judicial branch must maintain a continual vigil on
the groundwater problems with which it is confronted.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's position regarding judicial man-
agement of conflicting groundwater uses is unclear. In the first
case in which the court was confronted with the issue in 1933, the
court announced the following rule:
The American rule is that the owner of land is entitled to
appropriate subterranean waters found under his land, but he can-
not extract and appropriate them in excess of a reasonable and
beneficial use upon the land which he owns, especially if such use
is injurious to others who have substantial rights to the waters, and
if the natural underground supply is insufficient for all owners,
each is entitled to a reasonable proportion of the whole, and while
a lesser number of states have adopted this rule, it is, in our
opinion, supported by the better reasoning.45
This implies that the court will adhere to the conventional reason-
able use rule when no observable shortage of a groundwater re-
source exists, but the final phrase suggests the correlative rights
doctrine. As a result, the court's holding is subject to considerable
conjecture. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the
court has used both reasonable use46 and correlative rights47 lan-
guage subsequent to the Olson decision. Regardless of which test
the court chooses to apply, the focus of inquiry in litigation arising
under the Act must be the type of controls which the Act provides,
if there is to be some continuity in -the management of groundwater
in Nebraska.
A fourth judicial doctrine has been suggested by the drafters
of the Second Restatement of Torts48 and has received favorable
response from the commentators. 49 The proposed restatement rule
is based on a concept of unreasonable interference. It changes the
judicial inquiry from the reasonableness of an interfering use to the
unreasonableness of an interference itself. Thus a court would
theoretically not be predisposed toward a balancing test based upon
productivity factors, but would be governed by considerations of
ability to bear the cost of maintaining an adequate diversion for
45. Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933).
46. Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d
626 (1966).
47. Luchsinger v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 140 Neb. 179, 299 N.W.
549 (1941).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
49. See, e.g., Harnsberger, supra note 12, at 252-54.
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both users involved, the type of use to which each diversion is being
put, and the amount of water necessary to maintain both of the
competing uses.
It is obvious that each of these four means of judicial resolution,
with the possible exception of the correlative rights doctrine, is
geared only to the resolution of individual, isolated competing use
cases. This is largely due to the constraints under which the judi-
ciary must, of necessity, operate.
B. Constraints on Judicial Decisionmaking
The judicial branch is limited to the consideration of issues and
information which are supplied to it by the parties in individual
cases. Therefore, the judiciary is deciding area-wide issues on
groundwater supplies with only minimal information regarding
area-wide problems. Decisions are also based upon after-the-fact
considerations of use and the reasonableness of that use, and not
upon future needs of persons other than the parties before the
court.
To some extent, these inherent problems may be alleviated by
the expression of legislative intent in the Act. If the judiciary ap-
proaches each individual conflicting use problem with the future
economic needs of the entire state in mind, as directed by the Act,
area or aquifer wide shortages and problems may now be considered
in reaching decisions in individual cases.
The judiciary is also constrained by its age-old guiding concept,
stare decisis, which requires that past decisions, reached without the
benefit of information which is available today, be followed in mak-
ing new groundwater management decisions. Overcoming the prob-
lems created by stare decisis and the adversary system is the major
challenge which faces the judicial branch as it attempts to deal
with, and hopefully resolve, the problems created by the Act.
C. Judicial Resolutions of the Problems Created by the Act
The problem, left open by the Act, of whether vested property
rights in groundwater are subject to legislative control or extinc-
tion, is characteristically a judicial field of inquiry. So that the
Act may at least partially fulfill its purpose, it should be construed
as constitutionally valid legislation. Several methods of reaching
this result are open to the judiciary. It may consider the constitu-
tional dedication of surface water resources as sufficient to dedicate
GROUNDWATER
the groundwater of the state to public use as well. 0 It may utilize
the rather unfair judicial doctrine of damnum absque injuria to
cut off any potential right to damages that overlying landowners
may have as a result of control of their groundwater withdrawals.
But it must, if the Act is to be effective at all, find the controls
the Act utilizes as non-compensable regulation of a property right,
if such right exists in groundwater, rather than a compensable
damaging or taking.
While the foregoing decision is of critical importance, it may well
not be the type of decision which will have the greatest impact
on management of groundwater. Rather, the decisions with the
most effect will be those in individual conflicting use cases, arising
outside control areas where no taking or damaging issues will be
present, but which will form the judicial pattern of acceptance or
rejection of the controls provided in the Act. Without cooperation
between the judicial branch and that portion of the executive
charged with the responsibility to administer the Act, the same
problem evident without any management scheme-a piecemeal
group of decisions and administrative actions- will continue. The
judicial branch must thus devise not only a means of dealing with
its own doctrine of stare decisis in dealing with the problems which
arise with the constitutionality of the Act and the issues of taking
and interbasin transfers, but must also discover a method it can
utilize to overcome the practical problems of obtaining information
and creating area-wide policy.
Probably the most effective method of improving the amount
and type of information the judiciary has available to it in decid-
ing area-wide policy considerations is the procedural rule of "indis-
pensable parties." This rule has been articulated on several
occasions:
Indispensable parties to a suit are those who not only have an in-
terest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also have an
interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting their rights, or leaving the controversy in such condition
that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. 51
This procedural tool can be employed in two ways.
50. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
51. City of Omaha v. Danner, 186 Neb. 701, 703, 185 N.W.2d 869, 871
(1971). See also Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W.2d 181
(1972); Burke Lumber & Coal Co. v. Anderson, 162 Neb. 551, 76 N.W.2d
630 (1956); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-323 (Reissue 1975).
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The court could construe "indispensable party" to include the
Director of Water Resources or the Natural Resource District in
which the conflict arose, or in which the decision will have an ef-
fect. This would give the administrative agency charged with the
duty of formulating a groundwater policy for the state a forum
for the policies it intends to promulgate where there has been no
control area designation. It could also provide the judicial officer
hearing the case with the information necessary to make a decision
on sound hydrological considerations and groundwater policy.
The court could also construe "indispensable party" to include
all groundwater users whose supply will potentially be affected by
the decision in the case before it. This would provide the court
with the opportunity to examine the entire use being made of the
affected aquifer, and allow it to consider not only the arguments
of the conflicting parties, but the arguments of the broad spectrum
of users who elect to participate in the decision-making process as
parties. It would not only afford the users the opportunity to ex-
press local attitudes and economic factors other than those im-
portant to the conflicting users, but would give the court the
opportunity to render a decision which would be binding on all
persons diverting water from the aquifer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Ground Water Management Act is a start toward
comprehensive groundwater management in Nebraska, and with
the help of a concerned judiciary, can serve as a vital tool in de-
veloping a statewide groundwater policy. If the judicial branch
is receptive to the idea that it must act in concert with the legis-
lature to insure sufficient groundwater supplies for both present
and future use, it can devise tools which will allow it to remove
past barriers to comprehensive management, and effectuate the
purposes stated in the Act.
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